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Income Redistribution and Changes in Inequality in
New Zealand from 2007 to 2011: Alternative
Distributions and Value Judgements∗
John Creedy and Jesse Eedrah
New Zealand Treasury and Victoria University of Wellington
Abstract
This paper illustrates the effects of using different distributions and summary
measures, using New Zealand data for the period 2007 to 2011. Using an annual
accounting period, alternative welfare metrics and units of analysis are investi-
gated. In addition, the sensitivity to assumptions about economies of scale within
households is examined, and changes in inequality are decomposed into those aris-
ing from population and tax structure changes. When considering the period 2007
to 2010 all measures agree that inequality fell, although the extent of the reduc-
tion varies. For the period 2007 to 2011 (after the tax reforms of 2010) the answer
to the question of whether inequality in New Zealand has risen or fallen depends
crucially on the combination of welfare metric, income unit, adult equivalent scale
and inequality measure used. In empirical studies it is therefore important to ex-
plore a wide range of alternative approaches, providing information for readers to
make their own judgements.
∗Access to data used in this paper was provided by Statistics New Zealand under conditions designed
to give effect to the security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. The tables and
graphs presented in this report are the work of staff at the New Zealand Treasury and not Statistics
New Zealand. The views, opinions, findings and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the New Zealand Treasury. We are grateful to Christopher Ball, Peter
Lambert, Angela Mellish, Robert Stephens and two referees for comments on an earlier version of this
paper.
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1 Introduction
This aim of this paper is to examine recent changes in income inequality in New Zealand
and to assess the contribution of the tax and transfer system in reducing inequality.
Special attention is given to comparisons of alternative distributions and the implications
of using different distributions and summary measures of inequality. Stress is placed on
the role of value judgements, the need to be explicit about them and to consider the
implications of a range of alternative values. While the present paper does not offer
new theoretical insights, it provides an illustration of the need to consider alternative
distributions and measures, showing that unequivocal results are seldom available.
The context is one — not unusual in economics — in which there is something of a
dichotomy between theory and empirical analysis. While considerable attention has been
given to inequality in recently policy debates, those reporting empirical evidence often
provide only a limited range of results and do not always clarify either the nature of
the income concept (including, where relevant, the adult equivalence scales used) or the
unit of analysis. In the latter case, the individual is most often used without comment,
although it turns out that a number of familiar results regarding comparisons may not be
appropriate: for example, widely used welfare functions may be ‘inequality preferring’.
The empirical analysis is based on New Zealand Household Economic Survey data.1
The accounting period is thus necessarily a year.2 Given the use of an annual measure,
choices must then be made regarding precisely what is to be measured and the unit of
analysis. The former choice concerns what is often referred to as the ‘welfare metric’.
For example, this may be pre-tax incomes, wage rates, or a measure of expenditure or
consumption. Here no attempt is made to allow for the value of leisure.3 The unit
of analysis could be the family, the household, the individual or the ‘adult equivalent
person’. Both the welfare metric and the income unit could be artificial measures,
designed to allow for differences in the composition of households using adult equivalent
scales. Ultimately these choices cannot avoid the use of value judgements, so it is
important for empirical studies to provide a range of clearly described alternative results,
thereby allowing readers to make their own judgements. Indeed, the results presented
1Results were obtained using the Treasury’s microsimulation model, Taxwell (the ‘well’ in the name
of the model comes from Ivan Tuckwell, who made extensive and valuable contributions to tax and
benefit modelling in New Zealand).
2It is recognised that judgements about income distribution changes may well depend on mobility
characteristics and thus income measured over a longer period.
3Furthermore, no attempt is made to allow for changes over time such as the introduction of new
commodities, or relative price changes which may have differential impacts on different income groups.
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below demonstrate that the answer to the question of whether inequality in New Zealand
has risen or fallen in recent years depends crucially on the combination of welfare metric,
income unit and adult equivalent scales used.
Section 2 begins by briefly rehearsing some basic features of inequality comparisons
involving Lorenz curves and the value judgements summarised by a type of social welfare
function. Section 3 describes the inequality measures used, namely the Atkinson and
Gini measures, paying particular attention to the value judgements involved. The im-
plications of including zero values in the distributions are also examined briefly. Section
4 describes the range of distributions examined, distinguished by welfare metric and
income unit. The value judgements involved in choosing alternative units are discussed.
The data and construction of alternative distributions are explained in Section 5. In-
equality measures for New Zealand in 2007, 2010 and 2011 are compared in Section 6.
The period from 2007 to 2010 covers years which may be thought to be substantially
affected by the global financial crises. However, there were few changes in the tax struc-
ture. Major reforms took place in 2010, so comparisons involving 2011 are of interest.
The sensitivity of results to the assumption regarding economies of scale within house-
holds is examined in Section 6. A decomposition of inequality changes into population
and tax structure changes is presented in Section 7. In view of the timing of the tax
reforms, the empirical decompositions are examined for the period 2007 to 2011. Brief
conclusions are in Section 8.
2 Value Judgements and Lorenz Curves
The most familiar graphical device used to compare relative inequality (among income
units regarded as having no relevant non-income characteristics) is of course the Lorenz
curve. With all incomes ordered from lowest to highest, this plots the cumulative propor-
tion of people against the corresponding cumulative proportion of total income. Hence
concern is with relative inequality and the units of measurement of incomes (and hence
the arithmetic means) are irrelevant. Consider the two Lorenz curves shown in Figure
1, where distribution A lies everywhere inside that of distribution B. That is, A’s curve
is closer to the upward sloping diagonal line of equality which arises if all incomes are
equal. Distribution A is said to ‘Lorenz dominate’ distribution B.
Further insight was provided by Atkinson (1970), who pointed out that the intu-
itive judgement that distribution A is unequivocally less unequal than distribution B
3
Figure 1: Two Lorenz Curves
is consistent with the value judgement expressed by the ‘principle of transfers’.4 This
principle is the inequality-disliking value judgement which takes the view (again in the
context of homogeneous units) that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer unit,
which leaves their relative rank unchanged, reduces inequality. That is, it is possible
to move from distribution B to distribution A by a series of transfers, each of which
satisfies the principle of transfers. Faced with the desire to compare relative inequality,
it is therefore useful to begin simply by examining Lorenz curves to see if this kind of
dominance applies. However, in practice — and certainly in the case of the distributions
compared in this paper — such dominance results are rarely available, and it is necessary
to make further value judgements.
One way that distributions can be more widely evaluated involves the use of a social
welfare function, expressing explicitly the value judgements imposed in making compar-
isons. For a distribution xi, for i = 1, ..., n, suppose the evaluation function — repre-
senting the value judgements of an independent judge — takes the form,
∑n
i=1 U (xi),
where U (xi) is a function representing the contribution of individual i’s income to W .
5
4The choice of metric and unit, prerequisites for drawing the Lorenz curve, also involve value judge-
ments, as discussed further below.
5It is tempting to think of U (x) as representing a (cardinal) utility function, assumed to be the same
for all individuals. The case where U (x) = x (implying no aversion to inequality) thus corresponds to
the ‘Classical utilitarian’ case. However, it is necessary to think of U (x) as simply representing the
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The basic value judgements shared by all judges whose W functions take this form are
that evaluations are individualistic, additive and Paretean (such that an improvement
for any one unit, with no units being worse off, is judged to increase W ). Furthermore,
if U (x) is concave, so that the slope of the function falls as x increases and for xk > xj,
dU (xk) /dxk < dU (xj) /dxj. This additional assumption reflects adherence to the prin-
ciple of transfers (a transfer from k to j must increaseW ), where the degree of concavity
reflects the extent of aversion to inequality. Atkinson (1970) also established that, if the
two distributions have the same arithmetic mean income, all functions of this general
kind would judge distribution A to be superior to B, in that it gives a higher value of
W , as well as being more equal. This result is true irrespective of the precise extent of
aversion to inequality.6 If Lorenz dominance is established, all judges who have these
basic value judgements would agree about which distribution is preferred to the other,
irrespective of their precise aversion to inequality.
If the arithmetic means of the two distributions differ, welfare (as opposed purely to
inequality) comparisons require an explicit trade-off between (loosely speaking) ‘equity
and efficiency’. Shorrocks (1983) showed that Atkinson’s result can be extended if,
instead of the Lorenz curve, the concept of the Generalised Lorenz curve is used: this
plots the product of the proportion of total income and the arithmetic mean income
against the corresponding proportion of people. Thus the vertical axis of the Lorenz
curve is ‘stretched’ by an amount depending on the arithmetic mean. It is possible to
find that distribution A is more equal than B, but B is preferred to A if B’s Generalised
Lorenz curve is everywhere above that of A.
As with the Lorenz curve, dominance results are seldom available, so that more struc-
ture needs to be given to the welfare function; that is, more specific value judgements
need to be specified, leading to particular inequality and welfare measures. These are
discussed further in the following Section. When making comparisons between pre- and
post-tax and transfer incomes in any period, clearly only inequality measures are rele-
vant, but when comparing distributions over time, where mean incomes are expected to
change, both inequality and welfare measures are of concern.
contribution of x to W , reflecting the independent judge’s views.
6For details and elaborations for special cases where further assumptions regarding value judgements
can be used to establish dominance results when curves intersect, see Lambert (2001).
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3 Inequality Measures
This section describes the inequality measures used below, paying particular attention
to the value judgements associated with each measure. It is also necessary to recognise
that some of the distributions examined have zero incomes. The formulae given are for
unweighted distributions, but in practice weights are used to deal with both the sample
weights (for aggregation to population values) and, in some cases, the unit of analysis.
The Atkinson measure, for a relative inequality aversion parameter of ε, is defined
as the proportional difference between the arithmetic mean and the ‘equally distributed
equivalent’ income. The measure is based on a social welfare function, representing the
value judgements of an independent observer, of the form:7
W =
1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−εi
1− ε
(1)
for ε  0 and ε = 1, and incomes of xi, for i = 1, ..., n. If ε = 1, thenW =
1
n
∑n
i=1 log xi.
8
The equally distributed equivalent, xede, is that income level which, if obtained by every
unit, gives the same ‘total welfare’ as the actual distribution; hence xede is the power
mean:
xede =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
x1−εi
)1/(1−ε)
(2)
Then for arithmetic mean of x¯, the Atkinson measure, Aε, is:
Aε = 1−
xede
x¯
(3)
From the form in (1), it is clear that this is a member of the broad class of welfare
functions that are individualistic, additive, Paretean, and satisfy the principle of trans-
fers.9 From (3), xede = x¯ (1− Aε), which expresses the equally distributed equivalent
income in terms of x¯ and Aε. Hence the value of W corresponding to the distribution
can be written as x1−εede / (1− ε) = {x¯ (1− Aε)}
1−ε / (1− ε). This reflects exactly the
same ‘trade-off’ between equality, (1− Aε), and mean income as xede itself. Hence, the
welfare function associated with the Atkinson measure can be expressed in ‘abbreviated’
7Reference is sometimes made inappropriately to ‘society’s aversion to inequality’.
8The expression in (1) is usually used though strictly the numerator is x1−ε
i
− 1, for continuity with
the case where ε→ 1.
9It is obviously possible to modify the form of U (x) to allow, for example, for constant absolute
inequality aversion rather than constant relative aversion, but for convenience the latter specification
is used here.
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form asW = x¯ (1− Ix).
10 The nature of the trade-off is an important implication of the
basic value judgements underlying the use of the Atkinson measure.
Any distribution that is concerned with market income and includes non-workers
(and those without other income sources) can have income units with zero income. In
these cases, care must be taken in using and interpreting Atkinson inequality measures.
To illustrate a difficulty in the presence of zero values, suppose there are n individuals
with incomes of [0, 1, 1, ..., 1], so there is only one unit with a zero value and the rest
have equal incomes of 1 unit, and let ε = 0.5. The equally distributed equivalent income
is thus xede =
(
n−1
n
)2
. The arithmetic mean is x¯ = n−1
n
, so that A0.5 = 1/n. Hence for
large n inequality is zero. However, for all ε ≥ 1, inequality is 1.
In comparing results for different values of relative inequality aversion, it is useful
to consider the hypothetical ‘leaky bucket’ experiment suggested by Atkinson when
proposing his measure. Consider taking a small amount from person 2, with income of
x2, and transferring part of this to person 1, with x1 < x2, so that the ‘tax-transfer’ is
equalising. The transfer is thought to involve the use of a leaky bucket, so that some
income is lost in the process. A judge’s aversion to inequality is reflected in the tolerance
of leaks. Totally differentiating W in (1) with respect to x1 and x2 gives:
dW = x−ε1 dx1 + x
−ε
2 dx2 (4)
Transfers which leave W unchanged are thus given by:
dx1
dx2
∣∣∣∣
W
= −
(
x1
x2
)ε
(5)
Convert changes to discrete form, and consider taking 1 unit from the richer person, so
that ∆x2 = −1. The minimum amount that must be given to person 1 is thus:
∆x1 =
(
x1
x2
)ε
(6)
and the judge would tolerate a leaking bucket up to a maximum leak of 1−
(
x1
x2
)ε
. The
tolerance thus depends on the initial relative incomes of the two individuals and the
value of ε. Figure 2 illustrates the leakage from a ‘tax’ of 1 unit that would be tolerated
by a judge with varying ε values, for three different ratios of x1 to x2.
10Instead of writingW , as in (1), in terms of all individual incomes, the abbreviated form is expressed
in terms of summary measures of the distribution; see Lambert (2001). The abbreviated form is also
convenient to avoid negative values of W in cases where ε > 1.
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Figure 2: The Leaky Bucket Experiment
The values involved in using the Atkinson measure may be compared with the Gini
inequality measure. Geometrically, this can be regarded as a ‘distance measure’ of the
difference between the Lorenz curve of the distribution from the line of equality in Figure
1. A commonly used expression for the Gini inequality measure, G, for x1 < x2 < x3 <
... < xn, is:
G = 1 +
1
n
−
2
n2x¯
n∑
i=1
(n+ 1− i)xi (7)
Clearly for the distribution, [0, 1, 1, ..., 1], G tends to zero as n increases, and a Gini value
of 1 results from [0, 0, 0, ..., 0, 1]. The value judgements associated with the use of the
Gini measure are very different from those underlying the Atkinson measure. Indeed,
it can be shown that the Gini measure cannot be consistent with any individualistic,
additive, Paretean welfare function, W . However, an interpretation in terms of value
judgements is discussed below. First, further insight into the Gini can be obtained by
defining x¯R as an ‘reverse-order-rank-weighted mean’ of xi, given by:
x¯R =
∑n
i=1 (n+ 1− i) xi∑n
i=1 (n+ 1− i)
(8)
That is, each value is given a weight given by its ‘reverse rank’ (that is, its rank when
in descending order — ordered from rich to poor, rather than poor to rich). Using
8
∑n
i=1 i = n (n+ 1) /2, it can be seen that:
G =
1 + n
n
−
n (n+ 1)
n2
( x¯R
x¯
)
(9)
For large samples this reduces to:
G = 1−
x¯R
x¯
(10)
Hence the Gini has some superficial similarities with the Atkinson measure: both mea-
sures can be expressed as the proportional difference between the arithmetic mean in-
come and another type of average, or measure of location. A further similarity arises
when the value judgements underlying the Gini measure are considered although, as
shown by Sen (1973), they are very different from those associated with the Atkinson
measure. Suppose the contribution to W , the evaluation function of the independent
judge, from any pair of individual incomes is equal to the smallest income of the pair.
Hence the values implicit in the use of the Gini measure contain a ‘maxi-min’ kind of
idea — that only the lowest income matters in all pairwise comparisons. It can be shown
that the average welfare across all pairs of individuals is x¯ (1−G), which is of course a
welfare function expressed in abbreviated form.
The similarity in terms of abbreviated welfare functions means that, for both Atkin-
son and Gini measures, the form of the trade-off between average income and its inequal-
ity is similar for each case, although of course the magnitudes can differ substantially.
Consider a ‘social indifference curve’, showing combinations of x¯ and inequality, Ix, for
which W is constant. By differentiating the abbreviated forms, the slope of such an
indifference curve is given for each measure by:
dx¯/x¯
dIx/Ix
∣∣∣∣
W
=
Ix
1− Ix
(11)
This shows that, implicit in the values behind the use of these measures, a proportional
change in inequality of ∆Ix/Ix is viewed as being equivalent to a proportional change in
x¯ of ∆Ix/ (1− Ix).
In addition, these inequality measures are defined only for xi ≥ 0. Although any
attempt to include negative values in calculating Atkinson measures immediately runs
into difficulties, a value of G can mechanically be obtained, leading some investigators
to overlook the fact that Ginis should not include negative incomes.11 For example,
11Among New Zealand studies, Hyslop and Yahanpath (2005, p. 7) compute Ginis including negative
values.
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Table 1: Alternative Distributions
No. Welfare metric Unit Sharing Zeros No.
1 HH market income Household NA Yes H
2 HH disposable income Household NA No H
3 HH market income per AE Household NA Yes H
4 HH disposable income per AE Household NA No H
5 HH market income per AE Individual Equal Yes N
6 HH disposable income per AE Individual Equal No N
7 HH market income per AE Equiv indiv Equal Yes NE
8 HH disposable income per AE Equiv indiv Equal No NE
9 Individual market income Individual No No NW
10 Individual disposable income Individual No No NW
11 Individual market income Individual Yes Yes N
12 Individual disposable income Individual Yes No N
13 Individual final income Individual Yes No N
the distribution [−2, 1, 1, 3] has an arithmetic mean of x¯ = 3/4 but a value of x¯R = 0.
Substitution into (9) gives G = 5/4 = 1.25.
4 Alternative Distributions
Crucial choices when measuring inequality concern the nature of the welfare metric and
the income unit. This section describes a range of possible distributions. Clearly, the
choice depends on the precise question being asked.
4.1 Thirteen Distributions
The distributions examined here are listed in Table 1, using distinctions between the
welfare metric, the unit of analysis and the use of intra-household sharing rules. The
final column of the table gives the ‘population’ size, whereH is the number of households,
N is the total number of individuals, NE is the number of ‘adult equivalent’ persons, and
NW is the total number of employed individuals. In the table, the first eight distributions
listed relate to a welfare metric based on some kind of household income measure. Five
distributions with metrics based on individual incomes are then listed. The sequence by
which the distributions are constructed is described at the end of this subsection.
Considering households, the simplest cases are distributions 1 and 2 in Table 1 which
refer to total household market and disposable income respectively, for each of the H
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households. While some households may have no market income, the income transfer
system ensures that all disposable incomes are positive. The simplest case involving the
distribution of individual market incomes is number 9, where the population consists only
of those NW individuals participating in paid employment or profitable self-employment,
or who receive income from other sources such as rental, interest and capital income.12
This distribution contains no zero values. It may be compared with distribution number
10, that of disposable income for the same population of individuals. In comparing
individuals, comparisons of inequality measures usually assume (that is, take the value
judgement) that there are no non-income differences that are relevant: the units are
homogeneous.13 Given that standard inequality measures are designed to deal with
homogeneous units, no special problems arise.
However, distributions 1 and 2 involve units which are heterogeneous. The nature of
households, their composition and the way resources are shared among members, need
to be considered explicitly. There is a complex relationship between the distribution of
market incomes and inequality in the distribution of resources as more widely perceived.
A challenge is to construct distributions which in some way transform household incomes
so that suitable comparisons can be made. This is where difficulties arise, not only
because of the role of value judgements but because comparisons can involve artificial
income concepts (such as income per adult equivalent person) and artificial units (such
as the adult equivalent income unit). These aspects are examined in the following two
subsections.
Figure 3 illustrates the sequence for compiling the various distributions, moving from
the distribution of individual market incomes to household incomes and their transforma-
tion. The numbers in square brackets within each box refer to the distribution numbers
in Table 1. For example, [1 to 2] indicates that comparisons involve the movement from
pre-tax household income to post tax and transfer household incomes. Distribution 13,
which allocates items of government expenditure to individuals, is not included in the
figure in view of the complex nature of the allocation, explained in Section 5.
12Of course, distributions of these sources may be considered separately, but are combined here, as
discussed below.
13As mentioned earlier, in common with most studies no allowance is made here for utility from
leisure.
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Figure 3: The Sequence of Distributions
4.2 Adult Equivalence Scales
A common method of dealing with the heterogeneity of households, given only market
and disposable incomes, is to make comparisons on the basis, not of actual incomes,
but of an artificial income construct which reflects the differences in the demographic
structure of the households. A simple way to obtain an individual-level income is clearly
to assume an equal division within the household and divide total income by the number
of individuals in the household. But the view is widely taken that not all members of
the household have the same consumption needs. Furthermore, there may be economies
of scale within a household. The latter can arise because some goods (including some
durables and goods like heating and lighting) may be ‘public goods’ within the household
and can therefore be consumed simultaneously by several people. In addition, there may
be economies from purchasing larger quantities of some goods. Instead of dividing total
household income by the number of people in the household (irrespective of their ages
or gender), a measure of adult equivalent household size is obtained using a set of
adult equivalence scales. However, this approach continues to assume equal sharing, but
among adult equivalents.
Some people may object to the use of such scales. Those who take this view may, for
12
example, object to treating children in terms merely of a cost or burden faced by parents,
rather than as a desired benefit or advantage. They may consider household structure,
fertility decisions, household production and market income as jointly determined.
A simple but flexible adult equivalence scale is the following. Let na and nc denote
respectively the number of adults and children in the household, and let m denote the
adult equivalent size of the household. Then:
m = (na + θnc)
α (12)
where θ and α are parameters reflecting the relative ‘cost’ of a child and economies of
scale respectively. This form was introduced by Cutler and Katz (1992) and investigated
by, for example, Banks and Johnson (1994) and Jenkins and Cowell (1994). Creedy and
Sleeman (2005) found that, despite its simplicity, it provided a close fit to 29 alternative
sets of equivalence scales. Having obtained the adult equivalent size of each household,
it is a simple matter to calculate the total income per adult equivalent person.
4.3 The Unit of Analysis
Given the artificial welfare metric of income per adult equivalent, comparisons then
depend on the choice of unit of analysis in combination with this metric. The choice
is not as straightforward as has often been assumed. In fact, three further pairs of
distributions may be considered. First, comparisons can be made using the household
as the unit of analysis: this gives distributions 3 and 4 in Table 1. Second, perhaps the
simplest and most natural choice is to make comparisons using the individual as the unit
of analysis: this gives distributions 5 and 6. Third, as first suggested by Ebert (1997),
the unit of analysis could be the ‘equivalent adult’, giving distributions 7 and 8 in Table
1.
When using the individual as the unit of analysis, each person ‘counts for one’ ir-
respective of the household to which they belong. Inequality remains unchanged when
one person is replaced by another person with the same metric (income per adult equiv-
alent) but belonging to a different type of household. It thereby satisfies an ‘anonymity
principle’. However, it does not necessarily satisfy the ‘principle of transfers’. But if the
existence of large economies of scale means that rich large households are highly efficient
at generating welfare (in terms of the choice of this metric), it is possible, when using
the individual as unit, for evaluations to be inequality-preferring. This was first shown
by Glewwe (1991) and the welfare aspects are examined by Shorrocks (2004).
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The third possibility uses the equivalent adult as the income unit. This artificial
income unit is thus combined with its corresponding artificial income measure, income
per adult equivalent. In this case there are not necessarily integer numbers of equivalent
adults (except for single-adult households). Thus the distributions cannot be written
simply as vectors. The equivalent adult size must be treated as a household weight in
obtaining inequality or other measures.
The use of the artificial equivalent adult as the unit of analysis means that the income
unit and the income concept are treated consistently. Each individual’s contribution
to inequality depends on the demographic structure of the household to which that
individual belongs. Thus an adult in a one-person household ‘counts for one’. But an
adult counts for ‘less than one’ (has a weight less than 1) when placed in a multi-person
household. The use of this income unit is consistent with the principle of transfers. This
can be useful because of the general results discussed above linking this value judgement
to Lorenz curves.
Importantly, reliance on the strong results regarding Lorenz curves can be made only
in the case of comparisons using the equivalent person as the unit of analysis. It cannot
be assumed that comparisons are insensitive to the choice of income unit. Indeed, it is
quite possible for a tax reform to be judged differently, changing inequality and welfare
comparisons in opposite directions, when using the individual and the equivalent adult
as income units, as shown below.14
4.4 The Use of Allocation Rules
In the previous subsection the welfare metric was based on an assumption of equal
sharing among equivalent adults within the household. Further distinctions were then
made depending on the choice of income unit. Yet another approach is to begin by using
an explicit sharing rule to allocate income to individual members of each household.
Instead of taking total market income in a household, or individual market income for
those with positive values, household income is considered to be shared among all those
in the household.15 The particular sharing rule used may be based on special surveys
which provide information about income sharing, or it may be rather more ad hoc.
14Further examples are given in Decoster and Ooghe (2003) and Creedy and Scutella (2004).
15In the empirical analysis reported below, when this sharing rule is applied, sharing is actually
restricted to family members within a household.
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Suppose that the allocation rule is based on an additive household size, s, defined as:16
s = 1 + 0.5 (na − 1) + 0.3nc (13)
Hence the first adult is given a weight of 1, while all other adults are given a weight of
0.5 and all children are given a weight of 0.3. This type of explicit income-sharing rule
is naturally associated with the use of the individual as the income unit. The use of this
sharing rule gives rise to distributions 11 and 12 of Table 1.17
In addition to comparisons involving market and disposable incomes, ‘fiscal incidence’
studies go further and attempt to allocate some components of government expenditure
to individuals. In particular, health expenditure can be allocated based on age, gender
and summary information about individuals’ use of publicly financed health services.
Similarly primary, secondary and tertiary education expenditure can be allocated to
individuals based on age.18 This gives distribution 13 in Table 1.
The discussion has so far been in terms of distributions of market and disposable
incomes. Some household surveys contain detailed information about household ex-
penditures, and this can be used to compute an additional metric, that of disposable
income after the deduction of indirect taxes. However, if — as in New Zealand — there is
a broad-based goods and services tax applied at a uniform rate, combined with limited
excises (for example, on tobacco, alcohol and petrol), the allocation is straightforward
and involves an approximately proportional change. Hence, indirect taxes are ignored
in the comparisons reported here.19
5 Construction of Distributions
The data used here were obtained from the Household Economic Survey (HES) for the
years 2006/07, 2009/10 and 2010/11. Each year’s survey runs from July to June of the
next year and contains detailed information about incomes and household characteristics
for approximately 8000 individuals, grouped by households. This is sufficient to enable
the calculation of market income, welfare benefits and direct and indirect taxes. Each
16This formulation actually corresponds to the modified OECD equivalent scale, which does not allow
for economies of scale within households.
17Distribution 11 shares market income. An additional alternative distribution would be to consider
individual market incomes as in distribution 9 but with an additional N−NW zero values. Comparisons
with distribution 12 would then combine the effects of sharing and taxes and transfers.
18For details of an attribution process, see Aziz et al. (2014, Appendix C).
19However, when the incidence of education and health is examined in distribution number 13, Goods
and Services Tax is deducted before those components are added.
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individual in the survey is assigned a weight which makes it possible to aggregate from
the sample to population values.20
For the purposes of applying the tax and transfer system, ‘Economic Family Units’
(henceforth referred to as ‘families’) were constructed. A family is defined as a person,
a partner (if relevant), and any children under the age of 19 who is not in full time em-
ployment (henceforth referred to as ‘dependent children’). This construction is required
to model a significant proportion of the New Zealand tax and transfer system, such as
Working for Families and the core benefits.
From these data, a measure of market income was obtained for each individual. It
is possible for some individuals to have negative market incomes, almost exclusively
through negative self-employed income or large capital market losses. As discussed in
the previous section, it is invalid to include negative values in the calculation of the
Gini and impossible to include in the Atkinson measure, and neither of the reasons
for negative income provide a strong indication where they should lie in the income
distribution. Hence they were removed from the sample.21
The New Zealand tax and transfer system was then applied to the data by using
Treasury’s non-behavioural microsimulation model, Taxwell. This incorporates the ma-
jority of the rules of the tax and transfer system, including: Direct tax and ACC levies;
the core and supplementary benefits; Independent Earner and Working for Families tax
credits; New Zealand Superannuation; the Accommodation Supplement. Of relevance
here are earlier policies, such as the Low Income Earner Rebate, the Child Taxpayer
Rebate, and Transitional Tax Allowance. Many of these policies need information at
the family or household level to calculate entitlements, but all amounts are attributed
back to the eligible individual. An assumption is made that the receiver of Working for
Families tax credits is the adult rather than the child, and in the case of partnered adults
it is attributed to the partner with the least amount of market income, assumed to be
the primary caregiver of any dependent children. Thus, processing by Taxwell gives the
components of disposable income at the individual level. While Taxwell works with the
New Zealand system, many of the same types of policies and issues arise when applying
other countries’ systems and it is straightforward to apply these.
In the New Zealand tax and transfer system there are two benefits — the Student
20The weights used for this study are taken from Taxwell, rather than Statistics New Zealand’s HES
weights.
21Some investigators arbitrarily set negative values to zero, rather than removing them from the
sample.
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Allowance and the Accommodation Supplement — where a cash payment is tied to a
particular choice the person makes (regarding decisions about study and location and
type of housing). Both benefits are included in the calculation of disposable income.
A scheme similar in purpose to the Accommodation Supplement, the Income Related
Rental Subsidy, is not a cash payment and was instead treated as an ‘in-kind’ payment.
This process produces disposable income at an individual level. Those with zero or
negative disposable incomes are excluded. This may arise in cases of retired families
living entirely from savings, or sole students (who are counted as a family of one) incur-
ring debt. For the present comparisons it is important to maintain a consistent sample
across the alternative distributions. If a person or family was marked for deletion their
entire household was deleted. Thus, people and families in these households that did
not have invalid data were also deleted, even for distributions that concern themselves
with the individual. This ensured that all 13 distributions use an identical dataset. This
does not extend to when individuals with zero market incomes were removed for only
distributions 9 and 10, as these are valid members of the distributions.
As in Aziz et al. (2014), the explicit sharing rule in equation (13) was applied only
with families, rather than across households. The rationale behind this is that sharing
is much more likely to occur within a family. Sharing of financial resources is not likely
to occur to the same extent between families of adults, and is rare across shared living
arrangements where the individuals are not related. Similarly, the allocation of health
and education expenditure follows Aziz et al. (2014). Education expenditure is based on
total government spending on particular types of education. For example, primary and
secondary education is decomposed into schooling year or age groups, and those in each
category are allocated the appropriate expenditure. Health expenditure is attributed
using demographic per capita expenditure profiles provided by the Ministry of Health.
Unlike earlier studies, the Income Related Rental Subsidy is not included in dispos-
able income, but is included in the calculation of final income. In contrast, Student
Allowance payments are included in the calculation of disposable income. Thus, only
cash payments are in disposable income. A second difference is in the calculation of
indirect tax which, in view of New Zealand’s broad base, is here treated simply as a
constant proportion of disposable income, using the tax-inclusive Goods and Services
Tax rate. Furthermore, the data were not scaled to fiscal aggregates, since relativities
of income, taxes and transfers are important to preserve, and it is of less importance to
match macroeconomic variables with the national accounts.
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6 Inequality Comparisons 2007, 2010 and 2011
This section compares the alternative distributions and inequality measures. First, the
period 2007 to 2010 is chosen as covering the years of the global financial crises and a
period in which there were few tax and transfer changes. In view of the tax changes
made in 2010, additional comparisons are made including 2011. All results in subsections
6.1 and 6.2 are obtained using, where relevant, adult equivalent scales with θ = 0.5 and
α = 0.8. Sensitivity analyses are reported in subsection 6.3. As mentioned earlier,
Lorenz dominance results rarely apply in practice, and this is the case here. Of course,
even if they were to apply, concern is with the precise extent of redistribution resulting
from taxes and transfers and of changes over time, so that the formal inequality measures
are needed.
6.1 Comparisons from 2007 to 2010
A range of inequality measures for 2007 and 2010 are presented in Table 2. A dash (—) in
the table in the column relating to Atkinson measures for ε = 1.2 indicates that, in view
of the presence of zero values in the distribution, A1.2 is unity, as discussed above. The
table reveals quite substantial differences in the absolute values of inequality, depending
on the measure used (the degree of inequality aversion in the case of the Atkinson
measures) and the combination of welfare metric and unit of analysis.
The implications of the direct tax and transfer system, in reducing inequality when
moving from a gross to a net income metric, are shown in Table 3. These percentage re-
ductions are substantial, but again they vary considerable depending on the comparisons
used: for example in 2007 the Gini measure for the comparison between distributions 9
and 10 shows a reduction of 20.9 per cent, whereas the Atkinson measure, for Aε = 0.8,
falls by 75.3 per cent when comparing distributions 3 and 4. Any comments about the
redistributive effects of taxes and transfers must therefore be clear about the precise na-
ture of the comparisons being made. The changes for 2010 are generally slightly higher
than for 2007, although otherwise similar.
It is also of interest to examine the percentage changes in inequality between the
two years. These are shown in Table 4. With just two exceptions — for the distribution
of individual market income after sharing (number 11) and the Atkinson measure for
ε = 0.5 and ε = 0.8 — it could be said that inequality fell from 2007 to 2010. Despite
this large degree of agreement among measures and metrics, the extent of the reduction
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varies substantially. Disposable incomes have generally shown the largest inequality
reductions compared with market incomes.
6.2 Comparisons from 2007 to 2011
As discussed earlier, it is useful to consider changes in inequality over the longer period
2007 to 2011, in view of the tax changes announced in 2010.
The main policy changes made in 2010 concerned a partial shift in the tax mix from
personal income taxation towards indirect taxation, with associated adjustments to a
number of benefit levels.22 In particular, the percentage marginal income tax rates,
which in 2006/07 were [19.5, 30, 39], were changed to [10.5, 17.5, 30, 33]. Corresponding
thresholds, above which the respective rates applied, were [0, 38000, 60000] in 2006/07
and became [0, 14000, 48000, 70000] in 2010. The GST rate was increased from 12.5%
to 15%.23 A range of benefit abatement thresholds, such as Domestic Purposes Benefit
(DPB), Invalid’s Benefit (IB), Widow’s Benefit (WB) were changed from $80 and $180
per week to $100 and $200 per week, with abatement rates of 30% and 70% continuing
to apply. The New Zealand Superannuation Non Qualifying Spouse benefit (NZS NQS)
threshold was changed from $80 to $100 per week, with the abatement rate of 70%
remaining unchanged. In addition, in 2006/07 there was a Low Income Rebate (a 4.5%
tax rebate until $9500 per year where a 1.5% abatement begins). In 2010 an Independent
Earner Tax Credit applied, involving a $520 tax credit for income over $24000, abated
at 13% after $44000 per year. The Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) Levy
was 1.3% in 2006/07, and 2.04% in October 2010.24
Table 5 shows the percentage change over the period for each of the metrics and
inequality measures (although distribution number 13 could not be considered for 2011).
Unlike comparisons between 2007 and 2010, it can be seen that the direction of change is
more ambiguous. The Gini measures show small percentage increases for all distributions
except for the disposable income distributions in numbers 10 and 12.
22The HES is conducted from July to June, and Taxwell uses this for modelling the April to March
tax year. However, when modelling the so called ‘2011 year’ we use the 2010/2011 HES but apply the
policies that came into force at October 2010.
23For further discussion of the tax mix change, see Creedy and Mellish (2011).
24Changes to Portfolio Investment Entities (PIEs) could not be incorporated into the analysis. There
was a temporary additional payment to some benefit categories to compensate for price rises due to
the GST increase. This was paid from October until April 2011 when benefits would next be indexed
by the CPI. As a compromise, benefit payments were modelled according to the Taxwell tax year, thus
including only half the temporary payment.
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Table 2: Inequality Measures: 2007 and 2010
Atkinson for ε of: Gini
No. Welfare metric 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2
Year 2007
1 HH market income (H) 0.110 0.310 0.628 — 0.533
2 HH disposable income (H) 0.049 0.122 0.197 0.308 0.382
3 HH market income per AE (H) 0.106 0.300 0.615 — 0.523
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) 0.039 0.095 0.152 0.237 0.337
5 Market income per AE (N) 0.088 0.247 0.514 — 0.481
6 Disposable income per AE (N) 0.034 0.084 0.132 0.201 0.317
7 Market income per AE (NE) 0.092 0.258 0.535 — 0.489
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) 0.036 0.088 0.139 0.213 0.324
9 Individual market income (NW ) 0.094 0.242 0.407 0.670 0.502
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) 0.057 0.145 0.243 0.427 0.397
11 Individual market income (N) 0.126 0.334 0.633 — 0.583
12 Individual disposable income (N) 0.065 0.158 0.246 0.375 0.438
13 Individual final income (N) 0.044 0.107 0.165 0.236 0.364
Year 2010
1 HH market income (H) 0.102 0.289 0.591 — 0.513
2 HH disposable income (H) 0.042 0.105 0.169 0.260 0.356
3 HH market income per AE (H) 0.099 0.281 0.580 — 0.507
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) 0.034 0.082 0.130 0.196 0.316
5 Market income per AE (N) 0.087 0.244 0.505 — 0.476
6 Disposable income per AE (N) 0.030 0.072 0.113 0.168 0.297
7 Market income per AE (NE) 0.088 0.247 0.511 — 0.477
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) 0.031 0.075 0.118 0.176 0.302
9 Individual market income (NW ) 0.090 0.235 0.398 0.645 0.497
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) 0.050 0.127 0.211 0.357 0.376
11 Individual market income (N) 0.125 0.335 0.644 — 0.580
12 Individual disposable income (N) 0.060 0.145 0.226 0.331 0.423
13 Individual final income (N) 0.041 0.099 0.154 0.222 0.353
20
Table 3: Percentage Inequality Reduction from Market to Disposable Income
Change Atkinson for ε of: Gini
0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2
Reductions for 2007
1 to 2 -55.3 -60.5 -68.6 — -28.3
3 to 4 -63.4 -68.2 -75.3 — -35.5
5 to 6 -61.2 -66.2 -74.3 — -34.1
7 to 8 -61.0 -65.9 -74.0 — -33.7
9 to 10 -39.1 -40.0 -40.4 -36.3 -20.9
11 to 12 -48.3 -52.7 -61.1 — -24.8
Reductions for 2010
1 to 2 -58.6 -63.6 -71.4 — -30.6
3 to 4 -66.2 -70.8 -77.6 — -37.6
5 to 6 -65.8 -70.4 -77.6 — -37.7
7 to 8 -64.9 -69.6 -76.9 — -36.7
9 to 10 -44.8 -46.1 -46.9 -44.7 -24.4
11 to 12 -52.2 -56.7 -64.8 — -27.0
Table 4: Percentage Change in Inequality from 2007 to 2010
No. Welfare metric Atkinson for ε of: Gini
0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2
1 HH market income (H) -7.6 -6.7 -5.9 — -3.7
2 HH disposable income (H) -14.5 -14.1 -14.0 -15.6 -6.8
3 HH market income per AE (H) -6.6 -6.1 -5.7 — -3.1
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) -13.8 -13.8 -14.5 -17.3 -6.3
5 Market income per AE (N) -2.0 -1.4 -1.8 — -1.1
6 Disposable income per AE (N) -13.6 -13.8 -14.3 -16.3 -6.4
7 Market income per AE (NE) -4.8 -4.2 -4.3 — -2.4
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) -14.4 -14.5 -15.1 -17.3 -6.9
9 Individual market income (NW ) -3.9 -2.7 -2.2 -3.7 -1.0
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) -12.9 -12.6 -12.9 -16.4 -5.3
11 Individual market income (N) -1.3 0.5 1.8 — -0.5
12 Individual disposable income (N) -8.7 -7.9 -7.9 -11.6 -3.4
13 Individual final income (N) -8.2 -7.2 -6.5 -5.8 -3.1
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There is more ambiguity among the Atkinson measures. Measured inequality in
any period is higher, the higher is the degree of relative inequality aversion. But of
relevance here is the change in the Atkinson measure between two time periods. It is
not necessarily the case that judges will agree about the direction of changes in inequality.
If there are equalising changes in the lower ranges of the distribution, more importance
will be attached to these by a judge with high inequality aversion, who attaches less
importance to high-income changes. Alternatively a judge with lower aversion is more
concerned with the changes taking place in higher-income groups. From the evaluation
function, W , associated with the Atkinson measure, given in equation (1):
∂W
∂xi
= x−εi (14)
Hence, the increase in W associated with an increase in xi is not only lower for higher
incomes, but is lower for higher values of ε, for a given income. This has the potential to
lead to the counter-intuitive result, depending on the precise nature of the distributional
changes, whereby a higher aversion implies a decrease in inequality over time, where a
low aversion implies an increase.
Interestingly, in the present context, a judge with a higher degree of aversion to
inequality takes the view that there has been a reduction in inequality from 2007 to
2011 for all disposable income distributions (except for individual market incomes in
distribution 9, which shows as increase of about 1 per cent). However, a lower ε implies
a reduction in the cases of distributions of disposable incomes 2, 10 and 12, but an
increase for distributions 4, 6 and 8. Both the direction and extent of the measured
change in inequality depend on the particular combination of the welfare metric, the
unit of analysis and the inequality measure being considered.
It is also of interest to consider whether, for each social welfare function, the value of
W increases over the period. That is, in those cases where inequality is seen to increase,
is this compensated by an increase in real incomes (in the view of the independent judge’s
evaluation function)? This question is answered by comparing values of W = x¯ (1− Ix),
discussed above, where x¯ is suitably adjusted for inflation over the period. Table 6
reports percentage changes in the (abbreviated) social welfare function from 2007 to
2011. Generally the changes are positive. Hence, the increase in real incomes over the
period is judged to more than compensate for the increase in inequality, where relevant,
although again the percentage changes differ. The exceptions are for distribution number
5 (for Gini and A0.8) and distribution 11 (for A0.8). These cases relate to market rather
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Table 5: Percentage Change in Inequality from 2007 to 2011
No. Welfare metric Atkinson for ε of: Gini
0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2
1 HH market income (H) -0.01 -0.69 -1.17 — 0.57
2 HH disposable income (H) -0.47 -1.58 -3.12 -6.90 0.07
3 HH market income per AE (H) 0.87 -0.15 -0.97 — 0.82
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) 1.88 0.22 -1.90 -6.55 0.65
5 Market income per AE (N) 4.46 3.44 2.40 — 2.40
6 Disposable income per AE (N) 4.78 3.30 1.58 -1.66 2.01
7 Market income per AE (NE) 2.35 1.39 0.42 — 1.49
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) 2.85 1.48 -0.19 -3.60 1.18
9 Individual market income (NW ) 0.05 0.32 0.83 0.89 0.04
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) -4.32 -5.71 -7.31 -11.03 -1.81
11 Individual market income (N) 1.39 2.01 2.60 — 0.54
12 Individual disposable income (N) -1.01 -1.40 -2.25 -7.04 -0.40
than disposable incomes, and the distributions contain zero values. Furthermore, the
higher values for ε = 0.8 imply that there is greater sensitivity to changes at the lower
end of the distribution.
6.3 Adult Equivalence Scales
The results presented above are all obtained for a single set of parameters in m =
(na + θnc)
α, the expression for adult equivalent scales given in (12). Obviously these
scales do not affect all the distributions discussed here, but where they are relevant the
sensitivity of comparisons to the value of α, which reflects the extent of economies of
scale, was examined.
Consider, for example, the distribution of disposable income per adult equivalent,
using the individual as unit, and the Atkinson inequality measure. Using ε = 0.5
inequality in 2011 exceeds that in 2007 for all values of α, but when ε = 1.2 the order is
reversed and the distribution in 2007 is more unequal than in 2011. The case where ε =
0.8 is illustrated in Figure 4. The shape of the profiles indicates that simple assumptions
about the way in which changes in the economies of scale parameter affect inequality
may be misleading. There is a range over which an increase in α is associated with
reduction in inequality, and a range over which an increase in α produces an increase in
inequality.25 In addition, the two profiles intersect, so that for values of α above around
25For discussion of the precise conditions in terms of the relevant joint distributions and the correlation
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Table 6: Percentage Changes in Abbreviated Social Welfare from 2007 to 2011
No. Welfare metric Atkinson for ε of: Gini
0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2
1 HH market income (H) 2.0 2.3 4.0 — 1.4
2 HH disposable income (H) 10.0 10.2 10.8 13.3 9.9
3 HH market income per AE (H) 2.9 3.1 4.6 — 2.1
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) 10.5 10.6 11.0 12.9 10.2
5 Market income per AE (N) 1.3 0.5 -0.9 — -0.6
6 Disposable income per AE (N) 9.5 9.3 9.4 10.1 8.6
7 Market income per AE (NE) 1.4 1.2 1.2 — 0.2
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) 9.5 9.4 9.6 10.6 9.0
9 Individual market income (NW ) 3.1 3.0 2.5 1.2 3.0
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) 11.4 12.2 13.7 20.2 12.4
11 Individual market income (N) 1.3 0.5 -3.0 — 0.8
12 Individual disposable income (N) 9.5 9.7 10.2 14.0 9.8
0.45, inequality in 2011 is judged to be higher than in 2007, but for α less than 0.45, the
inequality ranking is reversed.
A similar kind of sensitivity arises for the distribution of disposable income per adult
equivalent person, when the income unit is the equivalent adult. Figures 5 and 6 show
the corresponding profiles for inequality aversion of ε = 0.2 and ε = 0.8 respectively.
For the higher value of ε = 1.2, inequality is judged to be greater in 2007 than in 2011
for all values of α.
An example involving the distribution of market income per adult equivalent person,
with the equivalent adult as the unit of analysis, is illustrated in Figure 7. In this case,
the distributions contain some zero values, so Atkinson inequality measures are reported
only for ε < 1. In this case, with ε = 0.8, inequality falls consistently as α increases
(that is, as the extent of scale economies falls), but again the two profiles intersect. For
α less than about 0.65, inequality in 2007 is judged to be greater than in 2011.
7 Inequality Decompositions
The previous sections of this paper have discussed alternative income distribution com-
parisons, either for a single time period (in moving from market to disposable income),
or for two periods. However, changes in measured inequality over time depend on the
between equivalent income and the number of individuals in the household, see Creedy and Sleeman
(2005, pp. 58—60).
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Figure 4: Inequality of Disposable Income per Adult Equivalent with Individual as Unit:
ε = 0.8
Figure 5: Inequality of Disposable Income per Adult Equivalent with Equivalent Adult
as Unit: ε = 0.2
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Figure 6: Inequality of Disposable Income per Adult Equivalent with Equivalent Adult
as Unit: ε = 0.8
Figure 7: Inequality of Market Income per Adult Equivalent with Equivalent Adult as
Unit: ε = 0.8
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structure of the population as well as the tax and transfer system. For example, there are
systematic variations in incomes over the life cycle. A change in the age distribution of
the population could therefore give rise to an observed increase in overall inequality even
if the tax system is changed in ways which are designed to make it more redistributive.
The fact that the redistributive effect of any tax system cannot be evaluated inde-
pendently of the population (the pre-tax income distribution) raises the question of how
comparisons can be made over time, where typically both the population and the tax
structure are different. In fiscal incidence studies the question is thus: has the income
tax and transfer system become more or less redistributive? The difficulty is therefore to
isolate the marginal effect of the tax policy change from that of the population change.
The various components are explained in subsection 7.1, and subsection 7.2 applies the
method to examine inequality changes between 2007 and 2011.
Such decompositions must nevertheless be treated with caution. First, the following
analysis does not consider endogenous labour supply responses to tax changes.26 In
addition, there may be other responses to tax changes which are nevertheless included
in population structure changes. These include changes in fertility, household formation,
migration and so on.
7.1 Tax and Population Components
Give two cross-sectional household surveys, let Ti denote the tax structure for i = 0, 1
(an initial period and subsequent period respectively). Similarly let Pi denote the pop-
ulation in period i. For convenience, consider the Gini inequality measure, although the
following approach may be used for other summary measures. There are therefore four
possible Gini inequality measures of both gross market income and disposable income;
denote these by Gm(Pi, Tj) and Gd(Pi, Tj) for i, j = 0, 1 . These four measures can be
obtained using each of the combinations of income concept and unit of analysis discussed
above. It is of course required that each survey contains enough information about the
characteristics of households so that the disposable incomes of each population can be
computed for each of the tax structures.
The comparisons in previous sections above are of Gini measures, in the case of
disposable income in each period, using Gd(P0, T0) and Gd(P1, T1). But the finding
that, for example, Gd(P0, T0) > Gd(P1, T1), following a policy change, does not support
26On decompositions which allow also for labour supply responses, see Bargain (2012a, 2012b), and
Creedy and Herault (2011). The latter paper also considers the use of money metric utility as the
welfare metric in decompositions.
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the inference that the policy reform has reduced inequality. The reduction may have
arisen from the population structure changes. The separate effects of tax and population
changes can be obtained as follows. Consider the following decomposition:
Gd(P1, T1)−Gd(P0, T0) = [Gd(P1, T1)−Gd(P0, T1)] + [Gd(P0, T1)−Gd(P0, T0)] (15)
The first term in square brackets on the right hand side of (15) is the population effect
given tax structure 1, and the second term in square brackets is the tax policy effect given
initial population 0. However, there is another possible decomposition of the change in
inequality, since:
Gd(P1, T1)−Gd(P0, T0) = [Gd(P1, T0)−Gd(P0, T0)] + [Gd(P1, T1)−Gd(P1, T0)] (16)
The first term in square brackets on the right hand side of (16) is the population effect
given tax structure 0, while the second term is the tax policy effect given population
structure 1. Faced with two values for each of the marginal effects, an approach is
to obtain the unweighted arithmetic mean: this average is recommended by Shorrocks
(2011), who links it to the Shapley Value, familiar from game theory.
7.2 New Zealand Comparisons 2007 to 2011
Table 7 reports the effects of applying the above decomposition to changes between
2007 and 2011. Values shown are absolute changes, and are the arithmetic means of
the relevant components. It is clear from the final two columns of the table that, for
all disposable income distributions and inequality measures, the effect of the tax and
transfer changes between 2007 and 2011 was to increase inequality of disposable incomes
slightly. However, the population structure changes had the effect, in all cases, of reduc-
ing measured inequality. Whether the overall effect was to reduce inequality therefore
depends on whether the population component outweighed the tax change effect. For
the Atkinson measures this is seen to be more likely for the higher inequality aversion
cases, where measures are more sensitive to changes at the lower end of the income
distribution.
8 Conclusions
This paper has emphasised the importance of making a range of value judgements explicit
when attempting to measure inequality, and changes in inequality, for any particular
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Table 7: Decomposition of Absolute Changes in Inequality of Disposable Income: 2007
to 2011
No. Welfare metric Component:
Total Population Tax
Decomposition based on Gini
2 HH disposable income (H) 0.0003 -0.0061 0.0064
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) 0.0022 -0.0061 0.0083
6 Disposable income per AE (N) 0.0064 -0.0024 0.0088
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) 0.0038 -0.0044 0.0082
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) -0.0072 -0.0126 0.0054
12 Individual disposable income (N) -0.0017 -0.0085 0.0067
Decomposition based on Atkinson with ε = 0.2
2 HH disposable income (H) -0.0002 -0.0019 0.0016
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) 0.0007 -0.0010 0.0018
6 Disposable income per AE (N) 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0018
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) 0.0010 -0.0007 0.0017
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) -0.0025 -0.0039 0.0014
12 Individual disposable income (N) -0.0007 -0.0027 0.0020
Decomposition based on Atkinson with ε = 0.8
2 HH disposable income (H) -0.0061 -0.0122 0.0061
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) -0.0029 -0.0095 0.0066
6 Disposable income per AE (N) 0.0021 -0.0046 0.0067
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) -0.0003 -0.0066 0.0064
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) -0.0177 -0.0228 0.0050
12 Individual disposable income (N) -0.0055 -0.0129 0.0073
Decomposition based on Atkinson with ε = 1.2
2 HH disposable income (H) -0.0212 -0.0298 0.0086
4 HH disposable income per AE (H) -0.0155 -0.0249 0.0094
6 Disposable income per AE (N) -0.0033 -0.0128 0.0095
8 Disposable income per AE (NE) -0.0077 -0.0168 0.0091
10 Individual disposable income (NW ) -0.0471 -0.0535 0.0064
12 Individual disposable income (N) -0.0264 -0.0361 0.0097
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population group. Special attention was given to comparisons of alternative distribu-
tions and the implications of using different distributions and summary measures. Is is
suggested that comparisons are too often based on a limited range of measures which do
not provide sufficient information for readers, whose value judgements may vary widely,
to make their own judgements. Using an annual accounting period, alternative welfare
metrics and units of analysis were investigated. The implications for redistribution and
recent changes in inequality in New Zealand were illustrated here using Gini and Atkin-
son inequality measures, where the latter also allow for a range of degrees of aversion to
inequality.
Some of the comparisons involved the use of adult equivalent scales. The use of a
welfare metric defined in terms of income per adult equivalent (for example, market or
disposable income) can be combined with the use of different income units, such as the
household, the individual or the equivalent adult. In addition, the sensitivity to assump-
tions about economies of scale within households was examined. Furthermore, changes
in inequality were decomposed into those arising from population and tax structure
changes.
When considering the period 2007 to 2010 all measures agree that inequality fell,
although the extent of the reduction varies. For the period 2007 to 2011 (after the
tax reforms of 2010) the answer to the question of whether inequality in New Zealand
has risen or fallen was found to depend crucially on the combination of welfare metric,
income unit, adult equivalent scale and inequality measure used.
When decomposing changes in inequality into tax and population components, it
was found that for all disposable income distributions and inequality measures, the
effect of the tax and transfer changes between 2007 and 2011 was to increase inequality
of disposable incomes slightly. However, the population structure changes had the effect,
in all cases, of reducing measured inequality. The overall effect on inequality (depending
on whether the population component outweighed the tax change effect) was found to
depend on the inequality measure used.
It should perhaps not be surprising that such a complex phenomenon as inequality
within a heterogeneous population does not allow simple unambiguous comparisons. It
is all too easy for researchers, often implicitly, to impose their own value judgements
or not to be aware of some of the complexities involved (such as the fact that the use
of the individual as unit, when using a measure of income per adult equivalent, can
imply a preference for more inequality if household size is strongly positively related to
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income and there are substantial economies of scale in consumption within households).
For many years the theoretical literature on inequality measurement has attempted to
untangle the many complexities and implications of alternative value judgements, yet
too often empirical studies have ignored the subtleties. An aim of the present paper
has thus been to persuade empirical researchers and policy analysts to investigate and
report results for a wider range of distributions and comparisons.
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